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Barnett vs. Corson.
Libel—Truth of Statement as a
Defence—Malice—Act of Apr. 11,
1901, Construed.*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Barnett was convicted of larceny on circumstantial evidence.
He was in fact innocent, but was compelled to serve a term in the
penitentiary. Upon his discharge he went to Colorado and made
friends. He became cashier of a bank and was about to marry. Cor-
son, animated by an old grudge, then wrote to the prospective bride
and to the president of Barnett’s bank, reciting his conviction and
imprisonment. As a result he lost both his bride and his position.
He brings this action against Corson for these losses.
Cohan for the plaintiff.
A libel may be defined to be any malicious publication written,
printed, or painted, which by words or signs tends to expose a per-
son to contempt, ridicule, hatred, or degradation of character. Col-
lins v. Dispatch Pub. Co., 152 Pa. 187; Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. 620.
Cited sections 1 and 3 of Act of Apr. 11, 1901.
LaBar for the defendant.
The truth of any defamatory words, is, if pleaded, a complete
defence to any action of libel or slander. Odgers on Libel & Slan-
der, p. 170; Press Co. v. Stewart, 119 Pa. 584.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HICKS, J.—This is an action of trespass for libel by Barnett
against Corson to recover damages for the alleged loss of his wife
and position as Cashier in a Colorado Bank. By the Constitution of
the State of Pennsylvania, in what is called the Bill of Rights,
* Originally published in 10 FORUM 57 (1905).
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“Every citizen may freely speak, write or print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”
The abuse of that liberty is what is called libel.
There is a statutory definition of libel in the Criminal Code of
Pennsylvania, and it is to the following effect: “That if any person
shall write, print, or exhibit any malicious or defamatory libel, tend-
ing either to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the reputa-
tion of one who is living, thereby exposing him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, such offence shall be deemed a misde-
meanor.” A libel may also be broadly defined to be “any malicious
publication written, printed or painted, which, by words or signs,
tends to expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or degradation
of character”—McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn, 340; Pittock v. O’Niell,
63 Pa. 253.
It is true that Corson based his publication upon a conviction
of the plaintiff in a proper court on the charge of larceny. Hence,
the defendant had sufficient probable cause to warrant his believing
that the plaintiff was guilty of the felony, for the commission of
which, he served imprisonment, even though convicted on circum-
stantial evidence but actually innocent. The question which presents
itself, then, for our consideration, is, whether, the whole truth or
substantial truth of his publication is an exoneration for the afore-
said publication.
The Act of 1901, P. L., page 74 and Sect. II, provides: “In all
civil actions for libel the plea of justification shall be accepted as an
adequate and complete defence, when it is pleaded, and proved to
the satisfaction of the jury, under the direction of the court as in
other cases, that the publication is substantially true and is proper
for public information or investigation and has not been maliciously
or negligently made.” The publication by the defendant was true,
for a competent court of competent jurisdiction had convicted the
plaintiff of larceny, the subject of this publication. But, we note, the
above act in the latter part of the 2d section says: “and has not been
maliciously or negligently made.” Of what vital import, then, is the
admitted fact of the truth or substantial truth of the publication if it
was maliciously or negligently made. The act as the Court under-
stands it is providing a defense for one who publishes any matter
concerning another without malice or negligence, i. e., to say that if
his publication is wholly true or substantially true, the pleading of
such, when found by the jury so, to be, is an adequate and complete
defence in all civil actions for libel.
In the case at bar, Corson was animated in the publication of
this information by an old grudge. The Standard Dictionary defines
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grudge to mean “Ill will; Hatred; Malice.” We, then, have the defen-
dant actuated by malice publishing defamatory matter concerning
the plaintiff. He, the defendant, cannot avail himself of the truth of
his charge as a defence, for under the Act of 1901, it is no defence if
“maliciously or negligently made.”
Under the Act of 1901, Sect. II, as quoted supra, we find em-
braced within its provisions “that the publication is proper for pub-
lic information or investigation,” another condition qualifying the
defense of truth or substantial truth as a justification. There are cer-
tain classes of defamatory words: (1) those which naturally and nec-
essarily import damage to another, those which are said in technical
language to be actionable in themselves; (2) and those which are
only libelous when they do special damage. Under the first class
with which we are necessarily engaged in this case, we find two
other classes: (1) words that impute a crime to a person of whom
they are spoken; and (2), words whose natural tendency is to injure
a man’s office, profession or business. This is verified in 11 Pa. 287,
Struthers v. Peacock et al. The statement of facts concedes the im-
putation of a crime to the plaintiff by the defendant, so, we hasten
to a further discussion of privileged communications, publications
proper for public information.
In order that the part of the act, referred to, above, be satisfied,
the communication must be made bona fide upon any subject mat-
ter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference
to which he has a duty although it contain criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. Is that
sufficient? No. It must be made to a person having a corresponding
interest—Bouvier’s Law Dict. It is beyond the comprehension of
the court to conceive of any duty or interest in this case which
would impel the defendant to notify the employers of the plaintiff
or his fiancee of his previous conviction or imprisonment. He was
actuated by everything else but duty or interest, i. e., by malice,
hatred or ill-will. Can it be possible that an imprisonment of a man
sometime ago places humanity under a duty to shout it to every
other individual? Neither the bank directors nor his fiancee were
interested in his past but in his present. Even, had they been, he was
an innocent man suffering a penalty for a misdirection of justice.
A privileged communication is one made upon a proper occa-
sion, from a proper motive and based upon reasonable or probable
cause; 111 Pa., 404, 414; Briggs v. Garrett; and also, perhaps in a
proper manner; for, if the manner be improper, the privilege is
lost;—Justice Mitchell in Conroy v. Pitts, Times, 139 Pa. 334. A
communication which would otherwise be privileged, if made with
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malice in fact or through hatred, ill will and a malicious design to
injure is not a privileged communication, but the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to show actual malice or malice in fact. Defendant
actuated by an old grudge was guilty of actual malice.
This communication was not privileged and the defendant be-
ing actuated by malice, this makes him amenable to all damages.—
In 5 Allen 169, Count Joannes v. Bennett it was held that a letter to
a woman, containing libelous matter, concerning her suitor, cannot
be justified on the ground that the writer was her friend and former
pastor, and that the letter was written at request of the parents, who
assented to all its contents. We also find in Krebs v. Oliver, 12 Gray
239, that, statements that a man has been imprisoned for larceny,
made to the family of a woman whom he is about to marry, by one
who is no relation of either, and not in answer to inquires, are not
privileged.
The damages to be paid by the defendant for his libelous publi-
cation must be assessed by the jury under the instructions of the
court. Where words are actionable as affecting the character of the
plaintiff, he is always entitled to go to the jury on the question of
general damages although no actual damage has been shown. Leitz
v. Hohman, 16 Superior Ct. 276; Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145. Special
damages are such as the law will not presume to have followed from
the words themselves but depend in part at least on the special cir-
cumstances of the case. Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Yeates 508; P. & L.
Dig. of Dec., Col. 18629. Court charged that if the verdict was for
the plaintiff, the damages should be compensatory only, unless the
jury found that the words were spoken with malignant feelings and
deliberate purpose to expose the plaintiff to ignominy and to injure
his character, in which case, exemplary or vindictive damage would
be appropriate. Stroud v. Smith 194 Pa. 502.
In view of the above decisions, the court charges the jury not
only to find compensatory damages, generally, for the plaintiff for
loss of character, and social position, but to find special damages for
the loss of his wife. The jury must also assess damages for loss of
position. On authority of the case, Stroud v. Smith, supra, you can
assess exemplary damages.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It is “horn-book law” that the truth of an assertion is a com-
plete defence in a civil action for libel. So spoke Justice Paxson in
Press Company v. Stewart, 119 Pa. 602. To cite authorities for so
fundamental a principle would be a work of supererogation. How-
ever, when A writes to B, “I believe B to be a witch,” he will be
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liable in damages, though he truly represented his belief. So, too
should he say, “C. believes B. to be a witch,” he would be liable
though he could prove that C. had this belief. So if he writes, “C.
says that B. is a witch,” proof of C’s declaration is no defence.
Whether stated as a fact or as the statement or belief of a third
person such an assertion tends to awaken similar beliefs or suspi-
cions concerning B. in the minds of others. The old English cases
held that if the defendant, at the time he repeated the words, gave
the name of the author so that the party injured might have his
action against the latter, this was a justification. The result was that
if an irresponsible scoundrel started a story one could get no re-
dress either from him or from the responsible person who later
quoted the words. The doctrine is now repudiated in the land of its
origin. Ames Cas. Torts, p. 421, u 1. In Pennsylvania the rule has
been applied in cases of spoken defamation, if the report was such
as to induce a reasonable belief. Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Yeates 508.
But it has not been extended to cases of libel. Oles v. Pittsburg
Times, 2 Super. Ct. 130.
Now, when Corson stated that Barnett had been convicted of
larceny, he in effect stated that some jury in a certain court, to-
gether also with the judge, had formally and solemnly declared this
belief beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed a theft.
Their belief was conclusive of the fact as far as the punishment of
Barnett was concerned, but is it a relevant matter in the trial of this
issue for libel?
To charge that Barnett was convicted of larceny is to make a
double charge; first, that Barnett was a convict; second, that he was
a thief. The first charge was true and Corson in any event can put
the record of the conviction in evidence and so justify the first
charge, but to prove the second charge he must convince the jury
before which he is a defendant that Barnett did in fact commit the
theft. Should the court have charged the jury that they must accept
the record of conviction as conclusive evidence of guilt when the
question arises collaterally in this issue? We know that Barnett was
in fact innocent. If, through the discovery of new evidence, he now
can convince the jury that he was really innocent, may he not do so
and thus repair his shattered reputation?
It has been repeatedly decided that where A has been indicted
for a crime and acquitted, he may not give the record of the acquit-
tal as evidence of falsity of a charge when he is confronted by a plea
of truth in an action for defamation brought by him against one
who revived the charge on which he had been tried. The reason
given is that the parties in the two suits are not the same. The de-
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fendant in the libel suit can say with force, “I was not interested in
the criminal proceeding and did not try to show A’s guilt.” Further,
the acquittal is merely a finding that the guilt was not proven and
not necessarily conclusive of A’s innocence. The defendant in the
libel suit may have secured conclusive evidence of A’s guilt, only
discovered after the acquittal. This evidence he may produce and so
escape liability for the alleged libel. England v. Bourke, 3 Esp. 80;
Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill. 209; McBee v. Tulton, 47 Md. 403.
Mr. Odgers applies the same rule when the defendant in the
libel suit offers the record of a conviction as evidence of the truth of
the charge made Odgers on Libel and Slander *547. But we have
found no American cases on the point and therefore will consider
the question as an open one. How should it be decided on princi-
ple? At first glance the cases seem analogous. In both there has
been a change of parties in the second suit. The Commonwealth is
no longer a party. A stranger is trying to take advantage of the
judgment obtained by the State. It is submitted, however, that there
is this important difference. When the defendant in this libel suit
offers the record of conviction as evidence of truth there is no room
for the plaintiff to reply, “I was not there to prove the falsity of the
charge.” He was there and he failed to discredit the proof of its
truth. He can only say, “You were not a party to that proceeding.”
To which it may be replied, “What of it? I would have only has-
tened your conviction.”
Again, suppose an action for malicious prosecution, which is
only an aggravated form of defamation, should have been begun
against the man who made the charge on which was founded the
prosecution for larceny. It is horn-book law that the evidence of the
conviction would be conclusive evidence of the truth of the charge
and that the truth in such cases is a complete defence, even should
the proof be ever so clear that when he made the charge he had no
ground for suspecting Barnett of the crime and was animated by
pure malice. Bigelow on Torts, Secs. 183 and 199. It may have been
the merest luck for this man that he escaped. If then, a man is to be
justified because a conviction followed the charge, how can we hold
liable the man who makes the same charge after a conviction and in
reliance on it? Surely he should not be in a worse position because
the conviction has become an established fact. True the one man
was the instrument of bringing the criminal to justice, the other only
increased his shame. But surely the law does not mean to encourage
men to prosecute from malice and without probable cause. It seems
to intend that the forfeiture of this right of action should be part of
the punishment for the crime, just as one who steals must submit to
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being called a thief. Reasoning by analogy we think that a convic-
tion should be as conclusive of truth in this libel suit before us, as in
the supposed suit for malicious prosecution.
In Magauran v. Patterson, 6 Ser. &. R. 278, a case is reported
that arose in Cumberland County. B. sued A. for slander, A. having
called B. a liar. A. plead the truth of his statement and on the the-
ory that a slanderer is a liar he offered evidence of a judgment
against B. for slander. Justice Gibson held the evidence inadmissi-
ble because the truth of the words was not in issue in the first slan-
der suit. But he expressed the opinion that had B. plead truth in the
first action and failed to sustain his plea, this would have been a
decision that B. said what was not true and, therefore, a justification
for calling him a liar. It happened that the parties to both suits were
the same, so that the objection of a change of parties did not arise.
He distinctly said that had falsity been proved in this first suit it
would have been conclusive evidence of the fact on the later suit. In
this case at bar the verdict of guilty in the criminal case was a dis-
tinct decision on the question now raised on the plea of
justification.
The question whether a defendant in the position of Corson
here should be allowed to escape is an interesting one of public
policy. It has been said that culprits should appear in their true col-
ors lest honest men be beguiled. On the other hand it is a clear
moral wrong for one who knows of a man’s early delinquencies to
come and blast a reputation earned by long years of good behavior.
To so pursue a man is to prevent his earning an honest livelihood
and to drive him back into crime. Notwithstanding this fact Mr.
Odgers thinks we should stick to the old rule and suggests that
“Where a man is really malicious in making a statement he is al-
most sure to go beyond the truth and say too much.” The strictness
with which a defendant is made to prove his plea is thus generally a
sufficient protection. Odgers on Libel and Slander *179.
But whether the rule is a good one or a bad one, it is certain
that it is the law unless we can find a statute that clearly abrogates
it. The learned court below refers us to the Act of April 11th, 1901,
and strictly limits his discussion of this phase of the case to a discus-
sion of the statute. We infer that he construed the act as abrogating
the common law on the subject. Is this correct? The act of 1901
repealed by express reference the Act of July 1st, 1897, but we con-
ceive that it left unaltered the common law rule that the proof of
the literal truth of a statement is an absolute defence regardless of
all other maters.
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In framing the Act of 1901 the legislature evidently had before
its mind cases of publication of newspapers, journals or books. Oth-
erwise the propriety of “public information and investigation” of
the matter published would be irrelevant. The common law rule de-
mands the literal truth of the defamation. Burford v. Wible, 32 Pa.
95, Shelly v. Dampman, 1 Super. Ct. 115. The Act of 1901 provides
that under certain circumstances something less, called “substantial
truth” shall be a complete defence. This is to widen the occasions,
when truth is an available plea, not to narrow them. One may now
escape not only on proof of literal truth but also on proof of sub-
stantial truth if the promulgation of it is not malicious or negligent
and the matter is proper for public information. The statute is af-
firmative in form and purports to confer an immunity from liability.
We cannot see how it can be construed to create a liability that did
not before exist. If it does so in any case it must be in that of news-
papers, etc., and not in the case of a private communication such as
this. Had it been intended to make the defamer responsible despite
the truth of the defamation, it would have been easy to say so, in-
stead of leaving such an intention to a most dubious inference. The
phraseology would probably have been, “In no civil action for libel
shall the plea of justification be received unless the matter is proper
for public information and the statement has not been maliciously
or negligently made.”
Before the Act of 1901, while malice was always said to be part
of the tort of defamation, the malice was generally “legal malice,”
that is malice which the courts declare to exist without direct proof
on this point, whenever certain other facts were found to exist. In
short, the malice was often a fiction and not a fact. The 3d section
of the Act of 1901 again illustrates the intention of the legislature to
widen immunity. It enacts that no damages shall hereafter be recov-
ered in any civil action for libel, unless it is established “to the satis-
faction of the jury” that the publication was maliciously or
negligently made. Hereafter a reprehensible state of mind must be
found as a fact. “But,” says the act, “where malice or negligence
appears such damages may be awarded as the jury may deem
proper.” This is the exact converso of the preceding statement and
could well have been omitted for it must have followed as a neces-
sary inference. It would be a violent twisting of this sentence to say
that it meant that wherever malice or negligence appears the jury
must give damages. But this is the only construction under which
one could recover for a malicious recital of the truth. The truth has
always in itself conferred immunity. Now we conceive there is a
new ground of immunity, namely, a blameless state of mind. It is
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absurd to infer that the creation of this new ground of immunity
involves a destruction of existing grounds of immunity.
A similar question of construction arose in Kansas. The state
Constitution provides that “in all civil and criminal actions for libel
the truth may be given in evidence and if it shall appear that the
alleged libellous matter was published for justifiable ends the ac-
cused shall be acquitted.” The Supreme Court of Kansas refused to
infer that the accused must be convicted whenever the matter was
found to have been published for unjustifiable ends regardless of its
truth. It held either truth or the justifiable end to be a good de-
fence. Castle v. Houston, 19 Kas. 417.
Was the Corson letter “negligently” made? What it says is true.
It was intended that it should say what it does say. By negligently
making a publication must be meant, “negligently” conducting the
investigation which has led the publisher to believe what he alleges.
If what Corson alleges is to be conceived as the verdict and sen-
tence, he was not negligent in making the allegation, for they actu-
ally occurred. While a man may negligently investigate, yet, if he
discovers the fact, his negligence would not be actionable. If we re-
gard Corson’s allegation as substantially, that Barnett in fact, stole,
we do not see how a jury could find that he was negligent in coming
to this conclusion. He had the judgment of the twelve jurors,
formed on sworn testimony, and sanctioned by the Court, in its act-
ing upon the verdict.
Corson’s motive in sending the letter was apparently, not to
benefit the bank or Barnett’s fiancee, a motive which the jury might
well find free from malice, but to hurt Barnett. He knew Barnett,
and had a grudge against him. He was “animated” by this grudge,
when he wrote the letter. His act was “malicious” in the popular
sense, which is also one of the legal senses. If we regarded the third
section of the Act of 1901 as applying to all cases, those in which
the defamatory assertions were true and these in which they are
untrue, it would follow that Corson should pay damages. We have
rejected this view.
The publicity of proceedings in court is for some reason,
deemed desirable, and a corollary has been drawn from this, that
the still wider publication of what is done in the court by means of
newspapers, etc. is permissible. “The initial principle seems to be”,
says, Townshend, Slander and Libel, 352, “that the public good re-
quires that the proceedings in courts of justice should be conducted
openly; * * * * A publication of the proceedings of a court only
extends that publicity which is so important a feature of the admin-
istration of the law in England, and thus enables to be witnesses of
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it, not merely the few whom the court can hold, but the thousands
who can read the report.” “We ought” says Pollock Ch. B. “to make
as wide as possible the right of the public to know what takes place
in a court of justice.” Ryalls v. Lader, Law Rep; 1 Ec. 298.
The publication of what goes on in court, is, therefore, re-
garded as lending vision and audition of what transpires there, to
those who are remote from the court room. A publisher of what is
actually said, in court by witnesses, counsel, judge, jury, has impu-
nity, unless it is shown that he publishes for some other object than
merely to inform the public of what occurs in the court-house. He
may publish a judgment of disbarment of an attorney, McLaghlin v.
M’Makin; Bright. N. T. 132; Pittock v. 0’Niell, 63 Pa. 253; 11 P. & L.
Dig. Decis. 18601.
Had Corson printed an account of the trial of Barnett in a
newspaper, in the course of his business as publisher he would not
have been liable to Barnett.
It does not appear clearly why the courts have favored the pub-
lication of judicial proceedings. Was it that the people might adjust
their relations and conduct towards the persons who appear in liti-
gation, by the new knowledge they thus acquire, of their solvency,
their honesty and integrity, their chastity, their disposition to use
violence, etc.? Is it supposed that every man has a right to know
whether X is a thief, or Y an adulterer, or Z a fraudulent debtor?
It would be difficult to justify a distinction between publication
of court proceedings within the judicial district and publication be-
yond, within the state and beyond. It would be equally difficult to
support a distinction between reports made shortly after the trans-
actions in court and those made a week, a month, a year afterwards.
Nor less easy is the effort to vindicate the toleration of the ordinary
newspaper publication, which may be read by five hundred or five
thousand persons while refusing it to an account written in a letter
for the perusal of two or three persons only. If the people in general
of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, might properly be informed
of the conviction of Barnett of larceny, it is hard to see why his
bank president and his fiancee might not be informed of it. Since,
however, the publication of court proceedings are in no case more
than prima facie privileged and since we have actual malice found
here as a fact, the defendant could not have hoped to escape liabil-
ity on this ground.
The damage in the case is so clear and abundant that it is hard
to conceive how the want of this element could be urged as a de-
fence. The discussion by the learned court below of the distinction
between those words actionable per se and those requiring proof of
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damage was, therefore, quite irrelevant and gratuitous. Had no
damage been shown, it would then have been important to prove
the words actionable per se as they doubtless were.
The lower court erred in failing to give binding instructions for
the defendant and the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
***
